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THIRD PARTY STANDING-"NEXT
FRIENDS" AS ENEMIES: THIRD
PARTY PETITIONS FOR CAPITAL
-DEFENDANTS WISHING TO
WAIVE APPEAL
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Whitmore v. Arkansas,' the United States Supreme Court de-
cided that a third party may not petition for stay of a defendant's
capital sentence if the defendant competently waives appeal.2 The
Court denied this "next friend ' 3 petition for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that the next friend petitioner lacked standing to
bring such an action.4
This Note posits that the Whitmore decision is consistent with
the majority of Supreme Court cases addressing third party and
next friend standing for individuals seeking appeals on behalf of
capital defendants. While one might analyze Whitmore as a case con-
cerning the philosophical arguments for or against capital punish-
ment, Whitmore is best understood as a standing case.
This Note analyzes Whitmore in light of third party standing and
next friend jurisprudence, and concludes that the Court's approach
in Whitmore is consistent with the demands of the Constitution's
"case or controversy" requirement 5 and the weight of Supreme
Court precedent. Additionally, this Note concludes that the Court's
strict, traditional application of third party standing principles is
preferable to the course urged by the Whitmore dissent. The dis-
1 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990).
2 Id. at 1728-29.
3 "Next friend" status is ajurisdictional grant of standing to a third party. The third
party is allowed to pursue the legal rights of the real party in interest. The grant of next
friend status historically has been limited to cases where, because of incapacity, incom-
petence or unavailability, the real party in interest is unable to advocate his or her posi-
tion. The next friend acts in the real party's stead to pursue the real party's interests as
the real party would if he or she were present.
4 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1728-29.
5 See infra notes 34-63 and accompanying text for discussion of Article III's case or
controversy requirement.
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sent's standing theory is outcome-motivated and would reduce the
predictability of Supreme Court standing decisions, unnecessarily
politicize the Court's standing determinations, and denigrate the
value of self-determination for criminal defendants.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 28, 1987, at four different locations in the town
of Russellville, Arkansas, Ronald Gene Simmons went on a shooting
spree, killing two people and wounding three others. 6 Later that
day, Russellville police officers arrested Simmons.7 After his arrest,
the county sheriff's office searched Simmons' house in nearby Do-
ver, Arkansas, and discovered the bodies of fourteen members of
Simmons' family, all of whom had been murdered. Five of the bod-
ies were found in Simmons' house; seven were buried in a shallow
grave outside.9 Two infant victims were found hidden in the trunks
of junk automobiles near the house.' 0
The state of Arkansas filed two sets of criminal charges against
Simmons." One charge arose from the two Russellville slayings,
and the other concerned the murders of his family members. 12 Af-
ter a trial on the Russellville murders in Franklin County Circuit
Court, the jury convicted Simmons of capital murder and sentenced
him to death.' 3 Immediately following sentencing, Simmons made
the following statement under oath: "I, Ronald Gene Simmons, Sr.,
want it to be known that it is my wish and my desire that absolutely
no action by anybody be taken to appeal or in any way change this
sentence. It is further respectfully requested that this sentence be
carried out expeditiously."' 4 After the trial court set a date for exe-
cution, Simmons continued to refuse his unqualified right to an ap-
peal.' 5 The trial court shortly thereafter conducted a hearing to
determine Simmons' competence to waive further appeals.' 6 The
court concluded that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived
his right of appeal.' 7
6 Whitmore, l10 S. Ct. at 1721.





11 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1721 (1990).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 183, 754 S.W.2d 839, 840 (1988).
15 Id
16 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1721.
17 Id.
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As Simmons' execution date approached, Louis J. Franz, a
Catholic priest who counseled inmates, petitioned the Arkansas
Supreme Court for permission to raise an appeal on Simmons' be-
half as his "next friend."' 8 In that proceeding, Franz v. State,19 the
court held that Franz did not have standing as Simmons' next
friend.20 The court also rejected Franz's claim for standing as "a
concerned citizen," wherein he argued that he should be heard so
that an important legal issue would not remain unresolved at the
appellate level.2 1 Additionally, in dicta, the court stated that a de-
fendant sentenced to death could waive his direct appeal "only if he
has been judicially determined to have the capacity to understand
the choice between life and death and to knowingly and intelligently
waive any and all rights to appeal his sentence." 22 The Arkansas
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that Simmons'
waiver met this test.23
After this defeat, Franz and another death row inmate, Darrell
Wayne Hill, applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to prevent Simmons'
scheduled execution. 24 The district court, like the Arkansas
Supreme Court, denied their petition, holding that Franz and Hill
lacked standing.25
Subsequently, an Arkansas trial court tried Simmons for the
murder of his fourteen family members. 26 On February 10, 1989, a
jury convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death by lethal
injection. 27  Simmons again waived appeal.28  The Arkansas
Supreme Court, pursuant to the rule it recently had established in
Franz, determined ihat Simmons had knowingly and intelligently
waived his appeal right, and affirmed the trial court's decision.29
Three days after the Arkansas Supreme Court's determination,
Jonas Whitmore, another Arkansas death row inmate, sought per-
18 Id See infra notes 64-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of next friend and
third party standing.
19 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988).
20 Id at 194, 754 S.W.2d at 842.
21 Idr
22 Idr at 189, 754 S.W.2d at 843.
23 Id. at 194, 754 S.W.2d at 844.
24 Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ark. 1988). The writ in this case would
have postponed the execution for the purpose of assessing the constitutionality of Sim-
mons' conviction in the Arkansas courts.
25 I at 1014.
26 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1722 (1990).
27 Id
28 Id
29 Simmons v. State, 298 Ark. 193, 766 S.W.2d 423 (1989) (per curiam).
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mission from the Arkansas Supreme Court to intervene "as a next
friend of Ronald Gene Simmons."30 Again, the Arkansas Supreme
Court denied this motion, concluding that Whitmore lacked stand-
ing to intervene.3 1 On Whitmore's request, the United States
Supreme Court granted a stay of Simmons' execution scheduled for
March 16, 1989.32 The Court granted Whitmore's petition for certi-
orari to consider fully the question of "whether a third party has
standing to challenge the validity of a death sentence imposed on a
capital defendant who has elected to forgo his right of appeal to [a]
state supreme court. '" 3
III. BACKGROUND
A. THIRD PARTY STANDING AND THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY
DEMANDS OF ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION
Article III of the Constitution establishes that federal judicial
power extends only to "cases" or "controversies. '3 4 The case or
controversy requirement is not easily defined, however. One might
argue that it should be defined broadly, because important issues
deserve full argument and clear decisions on the merits, regardless
of the form in which they are presented. However, the language of
Article III itself, separation of powers considerations, overburdened
federal dockets, and concerns about paternalism3 5 suggest the need
30 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1722.
31 Simmons, 298 Ark. at 255, 766 S.W.2d at 423.
32 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1722.
33 Id. The Court previously had encountered a third party petition to stay the execu-
tion of a capital defendant who wished to forgo further appeals in Gilmore v. Utah, 429
U.S. 1012 (1976). In a 5-4 decision, the Gilmore Court refused to stay Gary Gilmore's
scheduled execution. Id- at 1012. The dissent, however, argued that the issues raised by
Gilmore were sufficiently important to give the matter plenary consideration. Id. at 1020.
Since Gilmore, the Court has received other applications from third parties for stays of
execution. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, stay of execution den., 444 U.S. 807 (1979);
Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, stay of execution den., 440 U.S. 987 (1979). Whitmore was
the first case where the Court requested full briefing and argument in order to issue an
opinion on the recurring issue of a third party's standing for a capital offender who
wished to waive further appeals. 110 S. Ct. at 1722.
34 The Constitution provides in pertinent part that:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, sec. 2 (emphasis added).
35 One commentator has written that:
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for a narrow definition. Thus, the Supreme Court has struggled to
develop a consistent body of legal reasoning on the case or contro-
versy standard required by Article 111.36
The case or controversy demands of Article III are activated by
standing doctrine, particularly so when questions of third party
standing are addressed. The issues underlying third party standing
were first raised in the famous 1803 case Marbury v. Madison.3 7 In
Marbury, the Court noted the tension underlying questions of stand-
ing: the allocation of legal rights within a legal system organized to
serve both the litigants at bar, and the demands of the legal system
itself.3 8 Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury that these in-
terests often clash. He understood the appeal of the substantive ar-
guments made by Marbury, yet was reluctant to threaten the
executive branch's ability to make autonomous political determina-
tions. He stated that "the province of the court is, solely, to decide on
the rights of individuals .... ,,39
Other nineteenth century decisions also recognized the rela-
tively limited role of courts by prohibiting "friendly suits"-actions
brought by plaintiffs and defendants who agreed to bring a lawsuit
jointly after attempts to influence legislation had failed.40 Despite
prohibiting friendly suits, however, the Court did not explicitly dis-
cuss third party standing.
In Mississippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward,4 1 the Court first fo-
cused on the questions raised by a third party seeking to further a
generalized interest through litigation.42 Specifically, the third
party in Ward sought abatement of a bridge constructed across the
[C]ourts should be reluctant to act for paternalist reasons in the absence of legisla-
tive direction or guidance. But because no general bar to paternalist action is ex-
plicit or implicit in our Constitution, legislatures should be freer than courts to
embark on paternalist courses, subject only to popular will and to limited constitu-
tional restraints.
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 521 (1988).
36 "[The concept of'Art[icle] III standing' has not been defined with complete con-
sistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it." Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
37 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
38 The Marbuy Court recognized that the plaintiffjudge-appointee had strong sub-
stantive arguments for the delivery of his judicial commission, but noted that other in-
terests were also at issue, such as separation of powers considerations.
39 Id at 170 (emphasis added).
40 See, e.g., Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) ("it was
never the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act").
41 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1863) (complainant's nuisance suit could not be decided on
the merits unless the "plaintiff stands in a position to maintain this suit").
42 Id at 491-92.
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Mississippi River. 48 The Court rejected the plaintiff's petition be-
cause he lacked standing, stating that "[t]he private party sues
rather as a public prosecutor than on his own account; and unless he
shows that he has sustained, and is still sustaining, individual dam-
age, he cannot be heard."'44
In Frothingham v. Melon,45 even more clearly than in Ward,
"standing . .. emerged as the decisive issue."'46 The Frothingham
plaintiff sought standing to challenge the Federal Maternity Act as
an interested taxpayer.47 The Supreme Court denied standing, de-
claring that:
The party who invokes the power [of the courts] must be able to show
not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is imme-
diately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally.48
In the post-World War II years, the Court's formerly strict ap-
plication of the third party standing doctrine and the implementa-
tion of the case or controversy requirement loosened. 49 For
example, Flast v. Cohen,50 decided in 1968 by the Warren Court, was
factually similar to Frothingham, but in Flast the Court reached a dif-
ferent result. In Flast, the plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought standing to
challenge a federal education spending policy. 5' In contrast to its
Frothingham ruling, however, the Court held that concerned taxpay-
ers might have standing as third parties "if they could establish a
double nexus 'between the status asserted . . . and the claim.' "52
While the Court's intended meaning of this "double nexus" re-
mained unclear, the language in the opinion left the door open to
third parties seeking standing as taxpayers. 53
43 Id. at 492.
44 Id.
45 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
46 Note, More than an Intuition, Less than a Theory: Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 564, 564-65 (1986) [hereinafter Note, More than an Intuition].
47 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 448.
48 Idj
49 See generally Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881 (1983) (criticizes the broad view of standing, particu-
larly as it evolved during the post-World War II period).
50 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
51 Id. at 85.
52 See Note, More than an Intuition, supra note 46, at 565 (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
53 Third party taxpayer standing was not available for long, however. Just six years
after the Flast decision, the Court rejected taxpayer standing in United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, the Court held that the plaintiff did not have
standing as a concerned taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of secret CIA appro-
priations.
The Court further distanced itself from taxpayer standing in Valley Forge Christian
986 [Vol. 81
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In the 1973 case United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"), 4 the Court recognized its broadest
conception of standing. In SCRAP, a group of George Washington
Law School students were granted standing to challenge the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's failure to prepare an environmental
impact statement before implementing a freight surcharge for rail-
roads. 55 The students argued that as park users, their interests
would be affected, because implementation of a surcharge would in-
crease the amount of litter in parks the students were likely to
frequent. 56
Since SCRAP, the Court's third party standing jurisprudence
has returned to its early nineteenth and mid-twentieth century con-
struction of Article III. The Supreme Court has adopted a stricter
view of third party standing requiring that the plaintiff must have
suffered actual personal injury.57 Through a long line of decisions,
the Court has considerably pared back third party standing. Re-
cently, the Court even mentioned SCRAP with disfavor, terming it
"attenuated" and deeming it the "very outer limit of the law" re-
garding third party standing. 58
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
In Valley Forge, the Court held that the plaintiff did not have standing as a taxpayer to
challenge the transfer of surplus federal property to a religiously affiliated college.
54 412 U.S. 669 (1973) [hereinafter "SCRAP"].
55 Id. at 671.
56 Id. They claimed this increase in litter would result because recycled goods would
cost more after implementation of the freight surcharge. This in turn would make the
use of recycled goods less attractive. Id at 678.
57 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing denied to parents of black
children in suit against IRS tax policy toward allegedly discriminatory private schools
because plaintiffs alleged no personal injury); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)
(standing denied to plaintiff in civil rights action against city for police choke-hold prac-
tice because plaintiff could not show that he would actually be subjected to the choke-
hold); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (standing denied to plaintiff in suit challenging
the transfer of surplus federal property to a religiously affiliated college because plaintiff
did not establish that any of its members would actually suffer individual harm); Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (standing denied to indi-
gent plaintiffs in suit against Secretary of the Treasury for an IRS ruling, because they
could not demonstrate that they would be personally affected by the ruling); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing denied to community group challenging town's
ordinance for its allegedly discriminatory effects because plaintiff could not establish
that any of its members were personally harmed); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (standing denied to association opposed to the Viet-
nam War in a suit challenging congressional membership in reserves because members
of plaintiff group were unable to demonstrate a genuine individual interest); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (standing denied to community group which brought suit
against magistrate and state circuit court judge because the plaintiff could not demon-
strate that any of its members were personally injured).
58 Whitmore v. Arkansas 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1725 (1990).
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Through this return to the stricter application of standing doc-
trine and third party standing, the Supreme Court has developed a
set of criteria that a litigant must meet to have standing. Specifi-
cally, a litigant must: (1) "clearly demonstrate that he or she has
suffered an 'injury in fact;' "59 (2) allege an injury to himself or her-
self that is "distinct and palpable,"60 not "abstract," 6' "conjectural"
or "hypothetical;" 62 and (3) demonstrate successfully that the al-
leged injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action," and is
"likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." 63
B. NEXT FRIEND STANDING AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
"Next friend" status applies third party standing to criminal
law.64 Traditionally, courts granted next friend status to a third
party when the real party in interest was unable to bring the chal-
lenge himself or herself because of inaccessibility or mental incom-
petence.65 Third parties have successfilly represented criminal
defendants in such instances as where the defendant was held in a
foreign country, 6 6 subject to prison restrictions limiting his ability to
communicate, 67 incarcerated under "lock-down," 68 and declared ju-
dicially mentally incompetent, and thus unable to represent
himself.69
In addition to assessing the defendant's incompetence or inabil-
ity to pursue challenges on his own behalf, courts also have weighed
the next friend's qualifications or relationship to the real party
before granting next friend status. 70 Such assessments attempt to
59 Id. at 1723.
60 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
61 O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494.
62 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
63 Simon v. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976).
64 The concept of next friend standing is not exclusively limited to criminal law. See,
e.g., United States ex. rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (in civil
deportation proceedings against an illegal alien, counsel granted next friend status be-
cause of defendant's inability to communicate in English).
65 Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third
Party Intervention, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 908-09 (1983).
66 United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 n.3 (1955) (defendant's sister
granted next friend status while defendant was held in Korea).
67 Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1975) (next friend status
granted to petitioner's co-defendant when inmate was unable to communicate verbally
or by mail with his attorney because of prison restrictions).
68 Warren v. Cardwell, 621 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1980) (next friend status granted to
attorney when his inmate client was unable to communicate with the outside world).
69 Hays v. Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981) (next friend status granted to the
mother of a capital defendant found incompetent).
70 See, e.g., Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1974) (fact that none of capital defend-
ant's family members brought challenge at request of defendant was noted as possible
988 [Vol. 81
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determine if the alleged next friend has the real party's genuine in-
terests at heart, whether the next friend actually is acquainted with
the inmate, or is merely seeking next friend status to further his or
her own interests. 7 1
The Court has viewed third parties seeking next friend status
for uncooperative competent capital defendants suspiciously. In
each of the three cases presented to the Court under this fact pat-
tern, the Court has denied next friend status.72
In the first of these cases, Gilmore v. Utah,73 Bessie Gilmore, the
capital defendant's mother, petitioned for a stay of execution. The
Court denied the petition and refused to issue a stay, finding that
Gary Gilmore competently had waived appeal.74 The Court stated
that Gilmore's mother could be granted standing "only if it were
demonstrated that Gary Mark Gilmore [was] unable to seek relief in
his own behalf."75 In this instance, the Court noted that "the 'next
friend' concept [was] wholly inapplicable to this case." 76
As in Gilmore, the next friend applicant in Evans v. Bennett 77 was
the capital defendant's mother. Like Gary Gilmore, John Evans, the
defendant, wished to waive appeal and be executed. 78 Finding him
competent to waive his right to appeal, 79 the Court proceeded to
evidence that next friend petitioner had no real interest in defendant's welfare); Hays,
663 F.2d at 1009 (next friend status granted to mother of incompetent capital defendant
in part because court believed that her relationship with son would cause her to be a
good advocate for him); United States ex re. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (next friend standing granted to attorney to bring suit on behalf of
foreign language-speaking client under a deportation proceeding partly because of at-
torney-client relationship). But see Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (next friend
standing denied to mother of capital defendant because defendant wished to waive ap-
peals and was found competent to do so); Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273, 275-76
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (next friend status denied to defendant's minister and first cousin); Ev-
ans v. Bennett, 467 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Ala. 1979) (next friend standing denied to
mother of defendant because defendant was found competent and brought no post con-
viction proceedings on his own behalf).
71 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1728 (1990) (quoting United States ex. rel
Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1921)) ("it was not intended that the writ of
habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited med-
dlers, styling themselves as next friends").
72 Lenhard, 443 U.S. 1306, stay of execution den., 444 U.S. 807 (1979); Evans, 440 U.S.
1301, stay of execution den., 440 U.S. 987 (1979); Gilmore, 429 U.S. 1012, reh'g denied, 429
U.S. 1030 (1976).
73 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
74 Id at 1017.
75 Id at 1014.
76 Id
77 440 U.S. 1301, stay of execution den., 440 U.S. 987 (1979).
78 Id. at 1301.
79 Id. at 1302.
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deny his mother's application for a stay of execution.80 As in Gil-
more, the competent waiver of further appeals precluded next friend
standing for a third party's petition on the defendant's behalf.8 '
The facts of Lenhard v. Wolff8 2 are similar to both Gilmore and
Evans. However, in Lenhard, two deputy public defenders sought a
stay for the unwilling capital defendant, Jesse Bishop. To initiate
this stay, the public defenders first sought a writ of habeas corpus as
next friends.83 As in Gilmore and Evans, the Court held once again
that the petitioners lacked standing, because the defendant had
competently waived further appeal.8 4
Though these recent attempts to appeal a capital defendant's
sentence have been uniformly unsuccessful when the defendant
wished to waive appeal, courts nevertheless have established criteria
for establishing next friend status. First, the person asserting next
friend status must demonstrate why the real party in interest cannot
appear on his or her own behalf 8 5 Second, the next friend must be
truly dedicated to the best interest of the real party.8 6 Finally,
courts also may look to the next friend's relationship to the real
party.87 The Whitmore Court adopted and applied these criteria.
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
Writing for the majority,88 Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed
the writ of certiorari, holding that Jonas Whitmore lacked stand-
ing.89 The Court based its holding on the "threshold inquiry" of
standing, squarely rejecting Whitmore's claim that his interest in
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 443 U.S. 1306, stay of execution den., 444 U.S. 807 (1979).
83 Id. at 1308.
84 Id.
85 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1727 (citing Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d
1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)).
86 Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720, 722 (E.D. Va. 1975).
87 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text for discussion of this point.
88 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
89 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1721. Whitmore raised an eighth amendment claim that, in
addition to abridging his right to bring suit as Simmons' next friend, the Arkansas courts
also had infringed rights that the eighth and fourteenth amendments granted to him
personally. Id. at 1723. The Court declined to address the eighth amendment claim
brought by Whitmore on his own behalf, finding that he lacked sufficient Article III
standing. Id. at 1728-29.
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Simmons' execution created a "case or controversy." 90 The major-
ity also found Whitmore's argument for "next friend" standing
unconvincing.91
At the outset, the Court reviewed the requirements for Article
III standing.92 First, the Court explained that a litigant must
demonstrate that he or she has suffered an injury in fact.93 An in-
jury in fact, ChiefJustice Rehnquist emphasized, must be concrete,
and the complainant must allege not only that the injury is to him-
self or herself, but also that it is "distinct and palpable, ' 94 not
merely "abstract," 95 "conjectural," or "hypothetical." 96 Second,
the Court noted that a litigant must demonstrate that the injury
"fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision." 97
Whitmore argued that Arkansas' policy of comparative review
of sentences provided the basis for his standing to petition the
Court on Simmons' behalf.98 Comparative review, as practiced in
Arkansas,99 would operate if Whitmore were again convicted and
sentenced to death, and he subsequently appealed this sentence to
the Arkansas Supreme Court. That court would then compare
Whitmore's crimes' 00 to the crimes committed by other capital de-
90 IM. at 1724-25. See supra notes 34-63 and accompanying text for further discussion
on the case or controversy standard.
91 Id, at 1727.
92 Id at 1722-26.
93 Id
94 Id (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing denied to organizations
and individuals in suit against zoning board because no named plaintiff asserted an ac-
tual injury)).
95 Id (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (residents denied standing to
pursue discriminatory practices case against county magistrate and associate judge of
county court because none of named plaintiffs asserted an actual injury)).
96 Id (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (plaintiff denied standing in
civil rights action against city for police choke-hold practice because he could not show
that practice would actually affect him)).
97 Id (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)
(indigent plaintiffs denied standing in suit against Secretary of the Treasury for IRS
ruling because plaintiffs were unable to show that their injury resulted from the revenue
ruling)).
98 Id. at 1723.
99 See Collins v. Arkansas, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (Arkansas Supreme Court
explicitly adopted comparative review as a feature of capital case appeals in Arkansas,
and outlined the procedures to be followed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
100 Whitmore had inflicted ten stab wounds on his victim, cut her throat, and carved
an "X" on her face. Whitmore v. State, 296 Ark. 308, 756 S.W.2d 890 (1988). Con-
victed for murder, he was sentenced to death. Id When he petitioned the court for next
friend status for Simmons, Whitmore had already exhausted his direct appellate review.
Id. Arkansas also denied him state post-conviction relief. Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark.
55, 771 S.W.2d 266 (1989). Whitmore's assertion that the sentencing data base should
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fendants to insure that his sentence was not arbitrarily or freakishly
applied.101 Whitmore reasoned that if Simmons' death sentences
were not reviewed, then the horrible crimes committed by Simmons
would not be made part of the sentencing data base that later would
be used by a court to review Whitmore's sentence. Accordingly, the
omission of Simmons' sentence would skew the sentencing data
base, which would substantially impair Whitmore's interests. 0 2
Such a turn of events, Whitmore argued, could harm his chance of
having his sentence overturned on appeal, because Simmons' hei-
nous crimes would not counterbalance his single murder.103
The majority refused to accept this claim, not only because it
found such reasoning "too speculative,"' 0 4 but also because such an
argument assumed that Simmons' mass murder conviction would be
used in a comparative review of Whitmore's single murder. 05 Fur-
ther, the Court noted that Whitmore's claim was at least as specula-
tive as other cases where future injuries alleged by a third party were
found inadequate to establish standing.10 6
Whitmore next asserted that he deserved standing due to his
interest as a citizen in the Arkansas appellate process for capital
include Simmons' crimes depended on Whitmore's receiving future habeas corpus relief
entitling him to a new trial. Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1724.
101 See Collins, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106.
102 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1727.
103 Id. In its comparative review of Whitmore's original sentence, the Arkansas
Supreme Court found that his capital sentence was similar to capital sentences handed
down for felony murders committed in similar robbery situations. Whitmore, 296 Ark. at
317, 756 S.W.2d at 895. The Arkansas Supreme Court's employment of the Arkansas
comparative review system suggests that Whitmore's "complete data base" theory was
unrealistic. His sentence was compared to the sentences for other single murder de-
fendants, not multiple murderers like Simmons. I&
104 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1724.
105 Id.
106 Id. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (Court rejected doctor's prediction
of the effects of state law restricting abortions as pure speculation too remote for him to
establish third party standing); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (allegation that
police choke-hold practice could potentially injure petitioner if he were arrested in the
fiture was found too remote, and plaintiff was denied standing); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431
U.S. 171 (1977) (standing denied to plaintiff who brought suit against police for the
possibility that excessive force might be used against him in the future if he were ar-
rested); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) (standing denied to former Congress-
man who based his injury on possibility that he might later run for political office).
The Court also distinguished Whitmore from SCRAP, a case it termed "the very outer
limit of the law" regarding the standing question. Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1725. In
SCRAP, the majority argued, at least the plaintiffs alleged that certain specific and per-
ceptible harms "would befall its members." SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). No such
argument was made by Whitmore. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text for fur-
ther discussion of the SCRAP case.
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crimes.' 0 7 Specifically, Whitmore expressed an interest in the Sim-
mons execution as a citizen concerned with the proper administra-
tion of the Arkansas death penalty.' 0 8 The Court summarily
dismissed this argument, quoting Allen v. Wright: 0 9 "'This Court
has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government
act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer
jurisdiction.' "110
The majority also rejected Whitmore's argument that tradi-
tional standing requirements ought to be relaxed in death penalty
cases where the defendant waives appeal."' The majority explained
that Article III's case or controversy requirement was not a judicial
rule of practice, but an important constitutional requirement, and
"it [was] not for [the] Court to employ untethered notions of what
might be good public policy to expand our jurisdiction in an appeal-
ing case." 112
Finally, the majority declined to accept Whitmore's alternative
appeal for "next friend" standing, holding that his interests did not
satisfy the demands for granting such status: 113 Simmons was not
mentally incompetent, nor was he held in a foreign country or
otherwise unable to petition the Court on his own behalf. 14 Fur-
thermore, Whitmore not only had no meaningful relationship to
Simmons, but was acting in opposition to Simmons' wishes, as an "un-
invited meddler" rather than as a next friend.115
107 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1725.
108 Id
109 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing denied to parents of black children in suit against
IRS for its granting of tax-exempt status to allegedly racially discriminatory private
schools because parents' theory that their children were less likely to be educated in
racially integrated schools was too remote).
110 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1725-26 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 754). The Court also
quoted from Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S 752 (1982) (standing denied to organization dedicated to separation
of church and state seeking to challenge government's transfer of surplus federal prop-
erty to religious college because plaintiff did not prove actual injury), and Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (generalized interest of
citizens opposed to the Vietnam War was insufficient to establish standing in suit chal-
lenging Reserve membership of members of Congress).
11 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1726.
112 Jd
113 IL See supra notes 64-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional
requirements for granting next friend status.
114 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1728-29.
115 Id at 1727-28.
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B. THE DISSENT
Writing the dissent,'1 6 Justice Marshall condemned the major-
ity for failing to address Whitmore's eighth amendment claim. 117
The majority's emphasis on the standing issue to the exclusion of
the more important constitutional issue, in Justice Marshall's opin-
ion, was a "rigid application" of a mere "common law doctrine that
the Court has the power to amend." t8
Justice Marshall first addressed the question of appellate review
of criminal matters.1 19 While granting that the Constitution did not
require such review in non-capital cases, 120 Justice Marshall distin-
guished capital cases as uniquely irrevocable. 121
Justice Marshall next addressed mandatory appellate review for
capital offenders. He cited the Court's approval of state capital pun-
ishment statutes,1 22 arguing that the Court had upheld the constitu-
tionality of these state statutes because they provided procedural
safeguards against arbitrary or erroneous capital sentences. 125
Thus, the Court approved state death penalty sentences for Geor-
gia, 124 Florida, 125 and Texas 126 "in large part because the statute[s]
required appellate review of every death sentence."' 127 For further
evidence of his assertion, Justice Marshall pointed to statistics show-
ing that a relatively high rate of death sentences are overturned
upon appeal. 128
116 Justice Marshall was joined by Justice Brennan in the dissent.
117 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974)).
121 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in Thompson v. Oklahoma, where she stated:
Under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty has been treated differently from
all other punishments. Among the most important and consistent themes in this
Court's death penalty jurisprudence is the need for special care and deliberation in
decisions that may lead to the imposition of that sanction. The Court has accord-
ingly imposed a series of unique substantive and procedural restrictions designed to
ensure that capital punishment is not imposed without the serious and calm reflec-
tion that ought to precede any decision of such gravity and finality.
487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1730 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion) (Georgia death penalty
held constitutional).
125 Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (joint opinion) (Florida death penalty held
constitutional).
126 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (joint opinion) (Texas death penalty held
constitutional).
127 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1730 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128 Id at 1731 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For instance, since 1983, the Arkansas
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In addition to constitutional demands for mandatory appellate
review, Justice Marshall also found a societal interest in preserving
the integrity of the criminal justice system by such review.' 29 This
important interest, he asserted, was evidenced by the fact that "al-
most all of the 37 states with the death penalty apparently have pre-
scribed mandatory, non-waivable appellate review of at least the
sentence in capital cases."' 30 Furthermore, Justice Marshall noted
that Arkansas was the only state where a capital defendant's waiver
of appellate review could effectively preclude that review entirely.131
Finally, Justice Marshall addressed the standing issue, arguing
that it should be relaxed in capital cases.' 3 2 He asserted that stand-
ing was a common law doctrine, susceptible to adaptation and
change, and that review of capital cases was of such importance that
rigid standing requirements should yield to weightier concerns. 3 3
Lastly, Justice Marshall rejected the majority's worries about "med-
dlers," essentially arguing that the defendant's life was worth more
than judicial convenience.' 3 4
V. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision in Whitmore v. Arkansas was consistent with
both the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Con-
stitution and the great weight of Supreme Court precedent dealing
with third party and next friend standing. The majority recognized
the value of allowing competent criminal defendants to determine
for themselves whether further appeals were desirable. The dissent
Supreme Court had reversed 8 out of 19 death penalty sentences it had been presented
upon appeal. I& (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1732 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that, "[b]ecause a
wrongful execution is an affront to society as a whole, a person may not consent to being
executed without appellate review." Id. This statement drew on language from his Gil-
more dissent, where he argued that Gilmore's mother should be allowed to petition on
Gilmore's behalf, even though Gilmore wished to waive his appeals, because of the
stakes involved. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
130 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1733 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988 5 (U.S. Dept. of Just., July 1989);
Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to
Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L.R. 95, 113-14
(1987)).
131 Itt (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 196-97, 754
S.W.2d 839, 847 (1988) (Glaze, J., concurring and dissenting)).
132 Id. at 1735 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 "I would ... permit Whitmore to proceed as Simmons' next friend. The require-
ments for next-friend standing are creations of common law, not of the Constitution."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 1736-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ignored this precedent. The dissent also erred in treating Whitmore
as a forum for debate about capital punishment, rather than as a
relatively routine standing case. The dissent's view of third party
and next friend standing could distort the judicial process, leading
to a far more politicized world of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and
seriously threatening the value of self-determination for competent
criminal defendants.
A. THE MAJORITY POSITION WAS CONSISTENT BOTH WITH ARTICLE III
DEMANDS AND NEXT FRIEND PRECEDENT
The majority properly decided Whitmore. The decision is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence both of the
last twenty years and the weight of traditional Court standing juris-
prudence. Given the precedents regarding next friend status in cap-
ital cases, it is unlikely that Jonas Whitmore or his counsel could
have been genuinely optimistic about succeeding on the next friend
standing claim. Not only has the Supreme Court returned to the
traditional, strict application of third party standing in the last two
decades, but the Court has consistently denied next friend petitions
in capital cases where a third party sought to appeal a capital sen-
tence for an "uncooperative" defendant.
The first of these cases, Gilmore, is analogous to Whitmore.1 35 In
fact, Gilmore represented an even stronger case for granting next
friend status, because Gilmore's next friend petitioner was his
mother, who was more closely related to the condemned than Jonas
Whitmore was to Ronald Simmons. Nevertheless, the Court still de-
nied standing to Bessie Gilmore.
More important, Simmons did not meet the chief criterion for
next friend status articulated in Gilmore; namely, the third party
seeking next friend status would be granted standing only if he or
she could demonstrate that the real party was "unable to seek relief
in his own behalf."13 6
Like Gilmore, both Evans and Lenhard also were cases where the
Court denied standing to next friends seeking stays of capital
sentences for defendants who had competently waived appeal.
Thus, the Court has denied standing in every case in which a next
friend sought to appeal a capital sentence for a defendant who
135 The factual and procedural similarities between Gilmore and Whitmore are striking.
Both defendants were convicted of multiple murders. Both waived further appeal and
were judicially found to be competent to do so on the basis of psychiatric evaluations.
Lastly, the sentences in both cases were not reviewed by the respective state supreme
courts.
136 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1976).
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wished to waive appeal. The Court in Whitmore recognized this con-
sistency in precedent and decided accordingly.
B. THE MAJORITY'S STRICT APPLICATION OF STANDING DOCTRINE IS
PREFERABLE TO THE DISSENT'S APPROACH
Though respect for consistency, precedent and self-determina-
tion is an important value, the majority's opinion in Whitmore also
advances an approach to third party standing that is preferable in
the long run.'3 7 An approach allowing third parties with separate
legal or political agendas to enter a law suit where they have no
meaningful interest harms the judicial process and all citizens.
The dissent's position in Whitmore advocates the principle that
standing requirements are important, but not if the issues presented
by the case are particularly attractive or interesting to individual
judges. 3 8 ChiefJustice Rehnquist's criticism of such an approach is
well placed.139 The dissent's view would cause Supreme Court ju-
risprudence to degenerate into a political popularity contest-a po-
tential litigant would merely need to tally up the ideologies of the
members of the Court and determine if his or her potential claim is
attractive to a majority of the justices, regardless of constitutional
137 It is important to recognize that in the context of capital punishment, there is a
certain set of individuals who would support virtually any court decision somehow re-
ducing the net number of executions carried out, regardless of other effects such a deci-
sion would produce. It could be argued thatJustices Brennan and Marshall typify such a
view. These "perennial dissenters" have consistently voted against any action by the
Court where capital punishment is mentioned, even if the philosophical arguments
about the death penalty were not at issue, as in Whitmore.
Similarly, there is also a set of individuals who favor the execution of as many con-
victed murderers as possible. These persons would support any Court decision leading
to more executions, regardless of further considerations. Perhaps this group is typified
by the individuals who hold tailgate parties at prisons on days when executions are car-
ried out.
Any arguments about the effects of Supreme Court decisions on broader issues can
be expected to be ignored by the individuals mentioned above. Thus, the arguments in
this Note about standing assume that the reader is genuinely interested in further dis-
cussion of issues surrounding capital punishment and can lay aside absolute opinions
about the philosophical arguments underlying the capital punishment debate to engage
in further thought about a case that has far more to say about third party and next friend
standing than about executions.
138 Justice Marshall's view is that standing is merely "a common law doctrine that the
Court has the power to amend." Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1729 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
He seems to find no autonomous requirement in the language of Article III or the last
two hundred years of Supreme Court cases demanding competent parties to assert their
own interests. Perhaps, he believes that standing is a legitimate constitutional require-
ment, but one that should be trumped when the Court is presented with particularly
attractive cases.
139 "It is not for this Court to employ untethered notions of what might be good
public policy to expand our jurisdiction in ... appealing case[s]." Id at 1726.
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standing demands or existing standing precedent. If a sufficient
number of the justices find the issue interesting, then the potential
litigant would be granted standing. If not, then he or she would be
denied standing.
Such an approach, however, has the potential to burden as well
as to benefit advocates of particular policy choices. Once the Court
is released from Article III requirements and its own precedent, an
individual gaining today by a broad view of third party and next
friend standing may very well lose tomorrow.
A hypothetical from another area of criminal law illustrates this
point. Imagine that a large industrial corporation illegally dumps
toxic wastes and pollutes a residential area around its plant. The
corporation is caught and criminally prosecuted. It loses at trial,
and the court assesses a large criminal penalty against it. To dis-
pense with the matter and to avoid negative publicity, the corpora-
tion determines to forgo appeals and pay the criminal fine to make
the suit "go away." At this point, however, one of the corporation's
competitors who is concerned about future criminal liability for ille-
gal dumping decides to appeal on the first corporation's behalf as its
next friend. Though the actual defendant wishes to waive appeal,
the membership of the Supreme Court at the time might have an
unbounded interest in protecting large corporations, and thus grant
next friend standing to the second corporation.
Individuals willing to employ an expansive view of standing in
capital cases might be disappointed by the outcome of the hypothet-
ical. Under the broad view of next friend third party standing doc-
trine advocated by Justices Marshall and Brennan, this set of facts
would be quite plausible.1 40
Other situations are similarly illustrative. What if we allowed
third parties to be involved in the negotiation of plea bargains for
criminal defendants, regardless of the actual defendant's wishes?
Similarly, should we allow third parties to argue for or against a
criminal defendant's waiver of a jury trial, regardless of the compe-
tent defendant's wishes? Is this a state of affairs with which we
would be comfortable? Is such a situation consistent with tradi-
tional notions of individual possession of rights and liberties?
140 Imagine another hypothetical. A white supremacist engages in "hate motivated"
speech and is prosecuted under criminal laws prohibiting such speech. He loses at trial
and decides not to appeal. Because it is concerned with an adverse precedent, however,
a white supremacist group with vast resources decides to bring an appeal as his next
friend. A majority of the Supreme Court finds this an attractive issue, and thus grants
next friend status. Again, it is doubtful whether many of those advocating a broad appli-
cation of standing rules to "attractive" cases would find the result of this case attractive.
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These examples demonstrate that making standing determina-
tions on the basis of the attractiveness of an issue, or what a majority
of Supreme Court justices might deem to be "society's fundamental
interest"1 4 1 in a particular policy choice, is dangerous. Legislative
bodies are established to channel democratic impulses into policy;
courts are not.142 There are severe problems with allowing third
parties to act as real parties in interest when their aims are in con-
flict with the real party's wishes. If such a course is pursued,
Supreme Court standing jurisprudence will likely degenerate into
an exercise in tolling up ideologies and hoping the numbers are
sufficient.143
This last point illustrates the chief problem with the dissent's
view. The dissent fails to recognize, because of its preoccupation
with the capital punishment debate, that standing is a far-reaching,
important demand made by the Constitution, specifically applied by
a long line of Supreme Court cases. Ignoring the case or contro-
versy demands of the Constitution and the weight of Supreme Court
third party and next friend precedents would change the entire
function of the judicial branch for the worse.
C. THE DISSENT'S POSITION WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE VALUE OF
SELF-DETERMINATION
Oddly, the dissenters failed to recognize that their approach to
next friend standing was inconsistent not only with a general lib-
eral' T4 view of the value of self-determination, 145 but that it also
clashes with the positions the dissenters have taken in a host of
equally important cases where self-determination questions were
presented.146
141 Whitmore, 110 S. Ct. at 1732 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
142 See generally Scalia, supra note 48.
143 It is odd that members of the Court who represent a distinct ideology would advo-
cate such a course of action, when the ideology they represent seems to be greatly out-
numbered on the Court. If the Court's standing jurisprudence degenerates into an
ideological head count, the ideology the dissent is generally thought to represent will
lose out now, and for the foreseeable future. See Moore, Tuggingfrom the Right, NAT'L
LJ., Oct. 20, 1990, at 2510; Gest, Where the New Court is Heading, U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REP., Aug. 6, 1990, at 20; McMahon, Recent Criminal Law Rulings from the Supreme Court:
The Conservative Bloc Begins to Exercise Control, 3 DEL. LAWYER 49, 49-55 (1984).
144 "Liberal" in the sense that the dissenters' positions on other cases involving an
individual's right to make important decisions regarding his or her legal rights have
been expansive, and have consistently favored the value of self-determination.
145 This general point about self-determination is raised in Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence
of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297,
310-15 (1979).
146 This is not to say that members of the Whitmore majority have not previously taken
positions that could similarly be viewed as inconsistent under this criticism. A narrow
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In cases involving an individual's ability to purchase contracep-
tives, 147 possess obscene materials, 148 choose his preferred sexual
practices, 149 or have an abortion, 50 Justices Marshall and Brennan
consistently favored the right to self-determination regarding im-
portant personal decisions. Most striking, they recently argued in
Cruzan v. Missouri' 5' for the principle that an incompetent person
has the right to have food and water tubes withdrawn and end her
life. Apparently, the dissent believed that persons in comas who
have expressed only a vague interest in not being "kept alive by a
machine" should enjoy a right to "die with dignity," but that duly
convicted, competent capital defendants have no right to choose to
waive protracted appeal, be executed, and "die with dignity." If the
value of self-determination is worth anything, it must be especially
protected in cases where the individual's choice is unpopular, as
Simmons' choice to waive appeal and be executed was to Justices
Marshall and Brennan. The dissenters failed to give sufficient
weight to Ronald Gene Simmons' interests in this regard.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Whitmore, the Supreme Court held that a third party seeking
next friend status to appeal a capital defendant's sentence would be
denied standing because the defendant was found to have compe-
tently waived appeal. The Court correctly recognized that the case
or controversy standard of Article III and the Court's own third
party and next friend precedents demanded such an outcome. The
Court also correctly identified the danger in allowing uninterested
third parties with separate legal or political agendas to inject them-
selves into an "uncooperative" capital defendant's case. Finally, the
application of standing doctrine, consistent with the weight of Supreme Court prece-
dents would, however, tend to reduce the possibility that self-determination issues
would be successful or unsuccessful solely because of the membership of the Court at
any particular moment.
147 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (state law prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives by non-medical personnel to unmarried persons held unconstitutional in
opinion written by Justice Brennan).
148 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1984) (state law making the possession of porno-
graphic materials illegal held unconstitutional in opinion written by Justice Marshall).
149 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (state law criminalizing consensual sod-
omy upheld over vigorous dissent ofJustices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall).
150 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state laws criminalizing abortion held unconsti-
tutional, with Justices Brennan and Marshall in the majority).
151 Cruzan v. Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Black-
mun dissented, arguing that a woman in a vegetative state had the constitutional right to
have food and oxygen withheld, in order to "die with dignity," if it could be determined
on remand that she had expressed the wish not to be kept alive to friends, family mem-
bers or co-workers before her accident).
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majority in Whitmore accurately treated the standing issue presented
by the case on its own merits, and declined the temptation to view
Whitmore as a forum for further debate on capital punishment where
no such forum existed.
The dissenters in Whitmore argued that important constitutional
issues were at stake, apart from the standing question, and that
standing is merely a common law convention rather than a firm con-
stitutional requirement imposed on the judicial branch. However,
the dissenters ignored the weight of Supreme Court cases dealing
with standing, and in particular, the holdings of the three cases the
Court previously decided on next friend standing for third parties
seeking to appeal the sentences of "uncooperative" capital defend-
ants. The dissenters also did not recognize the danger of aban-
doning a meaningful doctrine of standing in favor of policy
preferences. Traditional standing doctrine makes litigation predict-
able and standing determinations less political and arbitrary. We
cannot allow the Court to grant standing to some litigants and deny
it to others merely because a majority of the justices find a particular
issue sufficiently attractive to bend the standing rules. A strict appli-
cation of standing doctrine, consistent with precedent, reduces the
chance that this will occur.
PAUL F. BROWN
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